Tenth Distinction. Third Part: On the Action that can Belong to Christ Existing in the Eucharist

347. About the third main topic [n.6] I ask three things: first about the natural active virtue in the Eucharist, namely whether Christ existing in the Eucharist could change by any natural virtue something other than himself; second about his action on the intellective power as object of it, namely whether any created intellect could naturally see the existence of Christ in the Eucharist; third, about his action on the senses as object of them, whether any sense could perceive the body of Christ as it is in the Eucharist or perceive the existence there of the body of Christ.

Question One. Whether Christ Existing in the Eucharist could, by some Natural Virtue, Change Something Other than Himself

348. As to the first question, argument is made that he could:

Because, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.12.1020a4-6, 11.1.1046a9-11, “active power is the principle of changing another thing insofar as it is other;” but Christ in the Eucharist has active power because he has every absolute form that he has in his natural existence; therefore he has in the Eucharist the principle for changing things.

But he who has the principle for changing things could do so through it, just as he could become a force for the gerundive ‘changing’, according to what was said in Rep. IA d.7 q.2 nn.61-62.

349. Again, a man living with mortal life is always being nourished, On Generation 1.5.322a24; but the body of Christ in the Eucharist would have lived with mortal life while Christ was mortal; therefore it was always being nourished; therefore nutriment would always be being converted into the body’s substance.     Therefore it would always be acting.

350. Again, a man living with mortal life always needs to breathe air in and out; the point is plain, because suffocation, whether in water or in air, always happens because of a deficiency of this sort (as is clear from On Respiration 16.478b15-16). The body of Christ, as above [n.349], lived here with mortal life; therefore it is continually breathing air in and out. But these are actions; therefore etc     .

351. Again, Christ as he is in the Eucharist has the same power of moving as he has in heaven, and that power is not impeded here; therefore Christ can, by that power, issue here in act, and consequently move his body with local motion.

352. On the contrary:

“Everything acting physically suffers reaction,” Physics 3.1.201a23-24; the body of Christ, as it is here, cannot suffer physically; therefore neither can it act.

353. Secondly as follows: a body acting on another body requires determinate closeness in place to the other body; the body of Christ is not here by way of location in place; rather, as regard every relation to another body, it is here as if it were not here, because it does not occupy place.

I. To the Question

A. About Human Powers

354. I reply:

As man is a composite of soul and body, so he has certain purely spiritual powers, which belong first to the soul and yet per se to the whole through the soul, as are the powers of intellect and will.

355. He also has certain bodily powers, namely which do not belong to the soul per se but to the whole thing conjoined of body and soul (from the beginning of On Sense and Thing Sensed 1.436a1-b8). And the things that belong to the conjunct whole are some more bodily, namely those that follow the nature of this sort of mixed body, and some closer to the nature of the soul, namely those that follow the whole animate body insofar as it is such.

B. Conclusions Flowing Herefrom

356. Reply, then, must be made about these powers in order, supposing that some here and there are active.

1. First Conclusion and its Proof

357. And let the first conclusion be that Christ in the Eucharist cannot use any bodily active power, whether it be merely bodily (namely what follows the nature of this sort of mixed body) or bodily in the sense of following first or immediately the animate whole.

358. The proof is briefly that all bodily active powers require that the passive object, on which they act, be close to them in location. These powers, as they are here [sc. in Christ’s body in the Eucharist] are not anywhere by location; therefore they cannot, as they are here, have a passive subject close to them in the way required for the action of such powers. The major proposition is plain from Physics 7.1.242b24-26, where it is proved that a bodily agent must be close to the passive subject, whether mediately or immediately.

2. Second Conclusion and its Proof

359. The second conclusion is that Christ in the Eucharist can use any spiritual active power.

360. This proof is through the opposite middle term [n.358], that a spiritual power does not require for action that it be located in place; for although what acts through a spiritual power is located in place yet there is no requirement that it be located there in place in order to do what it does.

a. Explication of the Second Conclusion

361. Now explaining this second conclusion specifically I say that Christ as he is in the Eucharist can have a merely spiritual action, namely both on the part of the principle of acting and on the part of the term of the action. He can also have an action spiritual on the part of the principle of acting but bodily on the part of the term of the action.

362. The first of these claims I prove because if some angel were present to Christ in the Eucharist, the soul of Christ could enlighten the angel and speak to him in mental speech, in the way that an angel existing where Christ is present could enlighten another angel or speak to him. For this enlightening and speaking only require an active principle sufficient for enlightening and speaking, and an able subject on the side of him who is illumined or to whom speech is made. And perhaps there is required closeness in definite ‘where’, or a simple closeness of the enlightener to the enlightened or of the speaker to the one spoken to. And their presence there in place is not required, just as neither is it if an angel were to speak to another. Now all this is included in the matter at issue.

363. But as to how Christ has a principle of enlightening angels and speaking intellectually to them, let it be supposed from Ord. III d.14 nn.80-83.

364. The second claim [n.362], namely that he can have an action spiritual on the part of the principle yet bodily on the part of the term, is made clear as follows, because an angel has a power, a non-organic power, of moving in place. The point is plain because an angel cannot have any organic power; the non-organic power can be a principle of moving a body as a whole, not as to the parts in the way our body is moved organically; but any intellective soul has such a power; therefore it can be the principle of such motion; and consequently it is merely spiritual on the part of the principle, because it is in no way organic, and yet it is bodily on the part of the term, because its term is the local motion of a body in place.

b. Objection to the Aforesaid Explanation, and Rejection of this Objection

365. And if it is argued [Godfrey of Fontaines] that then the soul of man has a twofold active power of moving in regard to a body in place (namely it has one organic power, as is plain, and besides this it has, for you, this non-organic power); but to posit this twofold power seems superfluous, first because both powers seem to be of the same nature, second because one of them cannot issue in act in our present state (as is manifest); - I reply that just as the soul is like an angel in many other respects, so too is it in respect of non-organic power to move a body. For there is no reason why this substance [sc. the soul] does not have this sort of power of moving a body. And universally, no substance should be denied something that would be a perfection in it unless it is plainly manifest that such perfection is repugnant to it; for, according to the Philosopher, On Generation 2.10.336b27-29, “nature is always to be considered worthy of what is better, as far as possible.”

366. And when you argue that the powers would be of the same nature [n.365], I deny it, for this non-organic power that moves the whole body at once, not in ordered parts the way an animal body moves limbs in forward progress - this non-organic power, I say, is of a different nature from the power of progression, because this power has the action of moving the whole body immediately, not part after part. But the other power cannot move the whole save by orderly movement of parts, and of part after part, just as now the power of progression first moves some parts, then others through them. and then the whole body. The two powers, therefore, are of different nature, because of parts that are of different nature.

367. To the second point, when you say that this non-organic power is vain, because no act of it can now be possessed [n.365], I say that we now posit taste and the other senses as necessary for the perfection of human nature, and yet there is no need for all of them to exist in their own act, nor to exist precisely in their own act in beatitude. But they are not vain, because they belong to the natural perfection of that in which they are. If therefore those senses are not vain whose use is vain for the state that is simply the perfect state of human nature (but their possible use is precisely for this [present] unnatural state), much more will the non-organic power of moving not be vain, although the use of it now will not be able to be possessed - but its use will be perpetual in beatitude, because not only will the blessed then be able to move their body progressively (that is, by moving one part first, and then another through it, and then the whole), but they will also be able to move their body in ‘where’ at once and immediately without such ordered motion of parts. More about this below, in the discussion of agility [Ord. IV d.49 suppl. p.2 q.5].

3. Final Opinion

368. I suppose, then, that this non-organic power of moving is in the soul of Christ, because it is also in the soul of each of the blessed, and not as to habit only but also as to act or possibility of use. He will also be able to use this power immediately, by moving some body as a whole in itself, as an angel could move it.

369. Perhaps Christ also used this power in this life, as when he escaped the hands of the Jews who, taking him up to the mountain “on which their city was set,” wanted to throw him down headlong [Luke 4.29-30]. Also when he slipped away from the hands of his parents and “remained in Jerusalem” [Luke 2.40-50], as is plain from Origen Homily on Luke 19, “when Jesus was 12 years old,” and it is read in the homily for the octave of Epiphany.

370. Therefore the soul of Christ as existing in the Eucharist will be able to use this motive power, by moving the species or the host - and perhaps thus is the host sometimes moved by Christ existing immediately there.

371. And if you ask, “Surely he first moved his body by this motive power before moving the host?” - I reply that this was not necessary, just as it is not necessary that an angel first move himself in place so as to move in place a body made close to him.

II. To the Initial Arguments

372. To the first argument [n.348] I say that the description of power that is ‘a principle of changing’ needs to be understood as far as concerns the power itself; but many impediments can come up or run together (either on the part of him who has the power or on the part of the object or of the medium), because of which he who has the power cannot issue in act.

373. Now if this gerund ‘changing’ is weighed according to what was said in Ord I d.7 n.212, about the power of generating, I say that it must be understood as far as concerns that power; but it does not follow that nothing could impede the actual changing.

To the second [n.349] I say that the body as it is here is nourished if it is nourished in its natural existence. But it does not follow that     therefore it acts as it is here, because nutrition is only the added generation of a part of the nourished substance, and this added generation can be through the action of the nutritive power either as it is here or as it is elsewhere.

374. Likewise as to the third, about respiration etc     . [n.350], I say that the body of Christ as it is here does not breathe air out or in, for then it would be necessary to posit some air as being here together with the body of Christ under the host. But yet the body of Christ as it is here has a cooled lung as it does elsewhere in its natural existence, because cold caused by the air drawn in there is caused concomitantly here, although not first.As noted before, Scotus is following the Aristotelian view that breathing is for cooling the body to balance the heat from the heart. ¹⁶

375. As to the fourth [n.351] I say that the motive power of Christ that is organic and bodily, although it is in the body of Christ as it is here, yet cannot be the principle of his action in the body as it is here, because it requires part next to part, not only in the whole but in reference to the location, so that through the motion of one part it might move in place another part. But that other motive power, the non-organic one, can be in action here as in heaven, and so he can in accordance with it move a body that is next to him, just as an angel could. But nevertheless he cannot move his body as it is here, because his body in this way of being is not subject to any motive power save immediately to divine power, as was said above [n.370].

Question Two. Whether any Created Intellect could Naturally See the Existence of Christ’s Body in the Eucharist

376. Proceeding thus to the second question [n.347], it seems that no created intellect could naturally see the body of Christ as it exists in the Eucharist.

First because that existence is supernatural and consequently a supernatural truth; therefore it is knowable only supernaturally;     therefore not by any intellect naturally. The proof of this last consequence is that a supernatural makeable can only be made supernaturally by a supernatural cause; therefore , by similarity, a supernatural knowable cannot be known by anyone naturally.

377. Again, the knowledge of faith is simply more eminent than all natural knowledge; but about the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist there is faith or the knowledge of faith (as about other articles), according to the article “holy Catholic Church;”As St. Bonaventure Sent. III d.25 a.1 q.1 ad 3, “The belief that the body of Christ is on the altar is better reduced to the article about the unity of the Church, as is also faith about the other sacraments.” ¹⁷ therefore etc     . The proof of the major is that otherwise there would be no necessity for faith to be simply infused, because, unless that knowledge were simply more eminent than all natural knowledge, nature would be able to attain it.

378. Again, if the intellect could naturally know the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist, the bad angels could know it, because Dionysius Divine Names 4 says that their natural powers remain in them complete; the consequent is false, because the enemies of grace cannot know the sacrament of grace.

379. And this is confirmed by Ambrose On Luke II n.3 “was sent,” because, according to him, the mystery of the Incarnation was hidden from the malign spirit; but that malign spirit would be equally able to perceive the Incarnation as the existence of Christ in the Eucharist, since the former would be naturally knowable for the same reason the latter was.

380. This is also confirmed by Damascene Orthodox Faith ch.86, where he says speaking of this sacrament, “Now this operation of the Spirit, which works supernaturally, which only faith can grasp...;” and a little later, “You ask how the bread becomes the body of Christ? I tell you: the Holy Spirit comes over it and does what is above reason and intellect.”

381. Again, no intellect can naturally know a future contingent; but this thing, namely that the body of Christ is under the Eucharist, is as undetermined as is a future contingent, because it depends purely on the divine will contingently disposed to it;     therefore etc     .

382. On the contrary:

The soul of Christ naturally knows that it is everywhere it is, and consequently knows that it is in the Eucharist; and so it can naturally know the existence with which (by reason of itself and the body) it is there.

383. Again, existence is not more excellently knowable than the existing thing of which it is the existence; but Christ is naturally knowable by a created intellect;     therefore his existence is naturally knowable too. The proof of the first proposition is that no mode of knowing can exceed beyond measure that of which it is the mode.

384. Again, the blessed naturally see the beatific act in another blessed, and yet the blessedness is not less supernatural than the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist; therefore etc     . The major is plain, because although a blessed not see the blessedness of another blessed in the Word, nor in himself nor in any special revelation, yet he can see that another is blessed, just as he can see another’s soul, or an angel or another angel’s essence, because the blessedness of an angel does not exceed his natural intellect more than the soul itself does.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas and Richard of Middleton

385. Here it is said [Aquinas, Richard] that the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist cannot be naturally known by the intellect of a wayfarer, because it is the object of faith. However it can well be known by the blessed, and that too in the beatific act, because things known obscurely, that is, by a wayfarer, are succeeded in blessedness by clear vision.

386. The same in substance as the first point above [n.385] is said in another way but for a different reason, namely that the natural light does not reach to knowledge of this existence.

387. There is disagreement on the second point [sc. the knowledge of the blessed, n.385], because it is said [Richard] that the blessed are able not only to see this existence in the Word but also in its proper genus. For although this mode of existence exceeds the faculty of the natural light, yet it does not exceed the faculty of the light of glory. And therefore, although no created intellect left to its natural light could see this way of existing, yet the intellect aided by the light of glory will be able to see it. Hence he says [Richard] that the mode of existence of the body of Christ under the sacrament and everything that belongs to faith is seen clearly by any blessed intellect not only in the Word, but also in the vision that is said to be vision in its proper genus.

388. And note that Richard does not prove that vision of this sort in the Word or in its proper genus is in the blessed, but he says “I believe”, and this is his proof.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

1. On the Acceptation of the Terms ‘Intellect’, ‘To see’, ‘Naturally’

389. I reply to the question by first expounding these three terms: ‘intellect’, ‘to see’, ‘naturally’.

390. For a created intellect is either altogether separate from matter, as an angelic intellect, or similar to it in its operation, namely the intellect of the separated soul and the intellect of the soul joined to a blessed body, which are like angels in operation (as I assume here, and it will be proved below [nn.398-400]); or it is a created intellect joined to a corruptible body, which ‘weighs down the soul’ Wisdom 9.15. And this last intellect only understands things that are imaginable or that are displayed in phantasms of what is imaginable, from On the Soul 3.7.431a14-b2.

391. By the term ‘naturally’ is not meant that the intellect can of its own nature know the object, for the intellect is like a blank slate which can know nothing of itself alone, ibid. 3.4.429b30-430a2. But what is meant is that the intellect naturally knows that which it can know with the concurrence of its natural causes, namely the active and passive intellect.

392. Now ‘to see’ brings in intuitive intellection as it is distinguished from abstractive intellection; and, as was said elsewhere [Ord. II d.3 nn.318-323, III d.14 nn.107-118], intuitive intellection is knowledge of a thing as it is in itself present; abstractive intellection can be of a thing as it is displayed in some likeness, which can be of the thing as existing or as non-existing, or as present or non-present.

393. The question, then, is not about ‘understanding naturally’ but about ‘seeing [naturally]’ because, when one is speaking of abstractive understanding or intellection, it is manifest that the intellect can naturally understand the body of Christ. For it is impossible to form or conceive any proposition whose terms are not conceived, but it is possible for our intellect to conceive this proposition ‘the body of Christ is in the Eucharist’, otherwise it could not form it. Therefore our intellect can, in some intellection, understand both this proposition and its terms.

394. And if you ask how Christ’s body or its existence in the Eucharist can be known by us by abstraction, I reply that Augustine teaches, On the Trinity 8.4 n.7, how we have faith about Christ, although, however, we have not seen Christ, namely that we do so (according to Augustine) in certain general intentions or concepts taken from singulars, as he teaches there at large. For it makes no difference to our faith whether we err in certain sensible conditions we have conceived about Christ, since our faith does not per se regard those proper conditions, but it regards an individual man, knowledge of whom can come to be in us from knowledge of any individual man. So too the existence of Christ’s body here could have come to be in us from some other existence, as the existence of something else contained in a container or signified in a sign or covered with a covering.

Now it is about ‘seeing’, that is, about intuitive knowledge of this existence, that the question here is being moved.

2. Solution Consisting of Three Conclusions

a. First Conclusion

396. And let the first conclusion be that our intellect in our state as wayfarers cannot naturally see the body of Christ as existing there in the Eucharist.

397. The proof of this is that an intellect that understands only from things sensible understands from these sensibles in the same way in which the sensibles are present to it; our intellect is of this sort for now, and sensibles are present to it in the same way before Christ’s body is there in the Eucharist as they are present to it afterwards;     therefore etc     . But our intellect does not see Christ’s body intuitively before, because that body is not there before; therefore it does not see it intuitively afterwards either.

b. Second Conclusion

398. The second conclusion is about an intellect not tied to sensible things in its understanding, and it is this: every such intellect, whether angelic or belonging to the separated soul or to a man in bliss, can naturally see the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist.

399. The proof is that an intellect disposed to intelligible things as they are intelligible in themselves understands first what is intelligible in itself first and consequently what is in itself a being first, because “as each thing is disposed to being, so is it disposed to truth,” that is, to intelligibility, according to Aristotle Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31. Now such an intellect [sc. one not tied to sensible things in its understanding] has regard to the whole of being, that is, to everything at all in the order of its intelligibility. But substance, in knowability just as in being, is first, prior to any accidental mode of the substance; therefore such an intellect understands substance first, prior to any mode of it, and consequently no mode under substance can prevent such an intellect’s understanding of substance.

400. The argument here is briefly as follows: an accidental mode in a per se object does not prevent knowledge of that object. The presence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist is an accidental mode of the substance of Christ’s body. Therefore, it does not prevent that substance from being known by an intellect whose per se object substance is. But it is the per se object of the abstract intellect that does not depend on sensible things in its understanding.

401. You will say [Aquinas, Richard, nn.385-386] that these points prove that such substance of Christ’s body could be known by such an intellect but not intuitively seen by it, because that existence is supernatural and consequently not proportioned to any created intellect as such intellect naturally knows.

402. First against the conclusion and then against the reason.

403. To the first point in two ways:

First, because an intellect able to know an object intuitively while the object is present can know its absence while it is absent (as is plain from On the Soul 2.10.422a20-22, because we know by vision not only light but also darkness); such an abstract intellect can know the presence of bread when bread is present, because this is not a supernatural object; therefore it can know the bread’s absence when bread is absent. And the reason whereby it can thus know the absence of the substance of the body of bread is reason too whereby it can know the presence of the substance of the body of Christ; for that body in itself is an object proportioned to such intellect in its act of intuiting. Therefore, the accidental mode of the body does not prevent it being an intuitable object for the same intellect.

404. The argument here is briefly as follows, that the whole of created being, as it is an object proportioned to such intellect as to abstractive knowledge, so also as to intuitive knowledge; for intuitive knowledge differs from abstractive knowledge only because of a different presence of the object; anything therefore that can be an object proportioned to the intellect in this presence can be an object proportioned to it also in that presence. If therefore any being can be abstractively known by such an intellect when present to it in one way, can as a result be intuitively known by the same intellect when perfectly present to it in its actual proper existence.

405. Also, against the reason for this response about the supernatural [nn.401-402] I argue as follows: that natural and supernatural do not distinguish the nature of anything in itself but only in relation to the agent (since for this reason is something called supernatural, because it is from a supernatural agent, and natural because from a natural agent); but a relation to different agents does not necessarily prove that something is different in itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity 3.9 nn.16-19; therefore it does not necessarily prove that it is different in idea of being intelligible.

406. This is plain because an imperfect being could be supernatural and something natural could be much more perfect than it, just as any substance is more perfect than any accident, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a10-b2, and yet in a substance that is purely a natural being there can be an accident that is supernatural.

407. This is also plain because the theological virtues (as charity and the like) are in a determinate species of quality, and, according to many [Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, Robert Kilwardby], an angel naturally has the principles for knowing all the species of beings; therefore an angel naturally has the principles for knowing these virtues, although they are supernatural beings.

c. Third Conclusion

408. The third conclusion is that a blessed intellect in no way sees through the beatific act the body of Christ in the Eucharist.

409. The proof is that someone blessed is only distinguished from someone not blessed in seeing the beatific object as it is the beatific object, and seeing the things that are included in it as it is such an object. But the body of Christ as it is in the Eucharist is not such an object (as is plain) nor is it included in the beatific object (it is plain). For it belongs equally naturally to the beatific object to include the thing of one sacrament in the idea of the seen object as to include the thing of another (just as it belongs equally to the truth of faith to believe the truth of one article as the truth of another). But it in no way belongs to the beatific object to include in the idea of what is displayed the conferring of grace on a child in baptism, or the conferring of grace on the penitent in confession - and these conferrings are equally truly included in these sacraments as the body of Christ is included in the Eucharist. Therefore in no way does the beatific object, as it is such object, include the body of Christ as a thing seen in the Eucharist.

410. I add further to this that much less is it required for beatitude that the blessed see the existence of the body of Christ in its proper genus, because much less is such perfection of vision required for beatitude than the perfection of vision in the Word.

II. To the Initial Arguments

411. As to the first argument [n.376]: if you argue uniformly ‘it is a supernatural being, therefore it is a supernatural knowable’ such that supernaturality refers to the same thing in antecedent and consequent, I concede the consequence, because supernaturality is referred to the entity in the consequent as in the antecedent; but then it does not follow that ‘therefore it can only be supernaturally known’; for this only follows if ‘supernatural’ refers to knowability.

412. But if you understand in the consequent, when ‘supernatural knowable’ is said, that ‘supernatural’ refers to knowability, I deny the consequence ‘it is a supernatural being, therefore it is a supernatural knowable’, because in the antecedent the

‘supernatural’ states relation to its cause, from which it can receive being. ButReading ‘autem’ rather than ‘aliud’ at line 921. ¹⁸ although it might only be able to receive being from a supernatural cause, yet it can be knowable naturally, because however much a thing may be supernaturally put into being, yet after it has been put into being it is a certain natural thing, that is, proportioned to a naturally knowing or naturally cognitive power.

413. Hence is plain the response to the adduced proof that ‘a supernatural makeable is not naturally makeable, therefore a supernatural knowable is not naturally knowable’, because if ‘supernatural’ in each place determines per se what it is added to, the consequent can be conceded like the antecedent, and then the minor that ‘this existence is a supernatural knowable’ is false. But if ‘supernatural’ does not determine per se what it is added to but something else implied, as ‘[makeable/knowable] being’, the consequence is not valid. For in the antecedent ‘supernatural’ per se determines this being under the idea of makeable and so is repugnant to what is meant by ‘to be made naturally’, while in the consequent ‘spiritual’ does not determine the knowable but the ‘to be made’, and so is not repugnant to it being known naturally.The argument is ‘a supernatural makeable is not naturally makeable, therefore a supernatural knowable is not naturally knowable’. So if, first, the latter clause or consequent means ‘a knowable only supernaturally is not a knowable naturally’ (as the former clause or antecedent means ‘a makeable only supernaturally is not a makeable naturally’) then the consequence can be allowed but the minor premise to complete the inference ‘this existence [of Christ’s body in the Eucharist] is a supernatural knowable’ is false. For it now means ‘this existence is knowable only supernaturally’ but in fact, despite being made supernaturally, this existence could still be knowable naturally (just as the world was supernaturally made but is naturally knowable to human beings). If, second, the term ‘being’ or ‘thing’ is added to the consequence so that it reads: ‘a supernatural makeable thing is not a natural makeable thing, so a supernatural knowable thing is not a natural knowable thing’, then the consequent is not about knowability but about makeability (as is also the antecedent). For the sense is ‘a knowable thing made supernaturally is not a knowable thing made naturally’, which is true but says nothing about whether what is thus made supernaturally is knowable naturally or not. ¹⁹

414. To the second [n.377] I say that this proposition is false, namely ‘whatever is known by faith exceeds whatever is knowable naturally’ when speaking of what is knowable by abstract intellect. But it is true when speaking of what is knowable naturally by our intellect in our present state as wayfarers; and therefore faith in it [sc. Christ’s body in the Eucharist] is necessary for us but not for the abstract intellect.

415. The reason for this denial is plain enough, because angels were intuitively able naturally to know Christ suffering and dying, just as they were able to know naturally his being alive with human life, but we have knowledge of faith about the death. Now the angels’ intuitive knowledge was much more perfect than our obscure knowledge about the same object. Thus do I speak about the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist.

416. As to the third argument about the bad angels [n.378], I say that, if any bad angel be permitted to use his natural cognitive power, he could understand any created intelligible thing, and consequently could understand the thoughts of hearts and the mysteries of grace as soon as they are posited in fact. But, as the Master says in Sent. II d.7 ch.10, angels can do many things of their nature that are not permitted to them; and so the supposition is made that a bad angel is not permitted to see the secrets of the heart. And in this way, and in no other, could he see the body of Christ in the Eucharist. Thus too must one suppose that bad angels are not permitted to see the mysteries of grace.

417. And in this way must the authority of Ambrose be understood about the mystery of the Incarnation [n.379] - not absolutely, such that no bad angel could see or know the integrity of Mary, both in mind and in body, as he can know just as well the touch of finger on finger or any intellect’s natural intellection. But he was not permitted to do so for definite reasons, so that our redemption might not be impeded. “For if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory” [I Corinthians 2.8], that is, they would never have procured my redemption by his death.

418. As to the confirmation from Damascene [n.380], I say that he is speaking about us in this present state, although one doctor [William of Ware] says that he is speaking both of angels and of us. But this cannot be true when speaking of the natural power of the angelic intellect (as was proved in the second conclusion of the solution [n.398]), but only of his power as he is permitted; and this about the evil angel.

419. As to the fourth [n.381] I say that a contingent thing as contingent, namely while it is in its cause, cannot be known by a created intellect. But to whatever extent something exists contingently in its cause, yet, after it has been contingently posited in existence, there can be determinate knowledge of it just as it now has determinate being, and that in any intellect that has regard to the whole of being. Therefore, although some intellect not be able to foreknow that the body of Christ will be contained in this host, yet once this has been done in fact, an intellect can very well naturally intuit Christ’s body existing there.

III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Aquinas and Richard

420. To the argument for the opinion.

As to the point about faith [n.385], it has been answered [nn.408-410].

421. As to the proof that then the habit of faith would not be necessary [n.385], I say that it is necessary for us, because our intellect, which gets its understanding from sensible things, can get nothing whereby to assent to such truth; and therefore a habit inclining it to assent is required. But another intellect, which regards the whole of being intuitively (and so this being too), can well have assent about this from the ideas intuitively seen of the terms; and therefore faith is not necessary for it.

422. When it is added that vision succeeds to faith [n.385], I say that this is true of the principal object of faith, which is God three and one, but it is not true of all the other things in respect of which there is faith. Otherwise the blessed ought to see in the Word that grace has been conferred in baptism, in penance, and in confirmation. The blessed would also always see in the Word the Incarnation of the Word, and his nativity and passion etc., which are not necessary (whether to be seen in the Word or in themselves) for someone to be blessed. Nor is it necessary in this way for the truth of the other sacraments or matters of faith to be always seen in the Word in order for some intellect to be simply blessed.

Question Three. Whether any Sense could Perceive the Body of Christ as it exists in the Eucharist

423. Proceeding thus to the third question [n.347], it is argued that the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist could be seen by a bodily eye.

First because the blessed, when seeing the species [of bread and wine], are not deceived, for deception is repugnant to blessedness. But if they were not to see the body of Christ, they could be deceived in believing the substance of bread to be there;     therefore etc     . At least they could be in doubt about whether the substance of bread was there if they did not see the body of Christ. Doubt is repugnant to the state of blessedness, as imperfection is repugnant to perfection.

424. Second, because if there were light at a point it would be seen or would be visible; therefore by parity of reasoning the body of Christ as it is here would be visible. The consequence is plain because Christ’s body is not here under the idea being less visible than if it had the form of a point. The proof of the antecedent is, first, because the light would diffuse itself like a sphere and it would be seen as a sphere; second, because reflection starts from a single point of the reflecting body (as is plain in a reflected line, and yet the ray reflected there is diffused first from that first point), but what the reflection comes from is seen.

425. On the contrary:

What is seen is seen in a pyramid whose base is in the thing seen and whose apex is in the eye. Therefore the body of Christ would be seen in such a pyramid. But there is no base for a pyramid at Christ’s body because it would be simultaneous with the base where the host would be seen, for Christ’s body is everywhere with the host. And then the body of Christ and the host would be seen together from within the same angle, because the angle is the angle of both. But things seen from within the same angle are seen as equal; therefore the body of Christ would be seen as equal with the species. The result would also be that the body of Christ would be seen as round, because the base from which the species is seen is round.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

426. It is stated here [Richard of Middleton, Thomas Aquinas] that a distinction can be drawn between glorious vision and non-glorious vision, and between seeing naturally and seeing miraculously. Neither sort of vision can naturally see the body of Christ in the Eucharist.

427. One reason set down is that there can be no contact there, and without contact there is no natural action in bodies. Now the reason that there cannot be contact there is that the body of Christ does not regard the species under the idea of quantity, but quantity is the only reason for contact.

428. And another reason is that color has regard to quantity as its per se subject; but Christ’s body has no ordered relation to place through quantity, and so not through color either. Therefore Christ’s body cannot, by any change, affect the medium through color and so it cannot reach vision either.

429. Now another reason is set down, that the species there cannot be derived from the object through a medium, because the object is not located in place; and such deriving is required for sight.

430. Another reason too is added, that the bodily light of glory, of the sort that is posited in the glorified eye, cannot reach an object that does not exist anywhere;     therefore it cannot reach Christ’s body either, since his body is not, as it is here, in any place.

431. A third added reason is that neither can a miracle raise an eye to knowledge of the body, because the eye cannot be raised to knowledge of the existence of a separate substance; but the body of Christ as it is here has the mode of existence of a separate substance; therefore etc     .

2. Refutation of the Opinion

432. Against the first argument [n.426]: an angel is never present to a place save definitively, but it moves in place a body proportionally present to it; and if it had the power to alter it, it would alter the body as it is present here; therefore bodily existence is not required on the part of the angelic mover for him to alter the organ toward sensation.

433. Again, the body of Christ is not present anywhere in the species save in the smallest thing perceptible (for it is not present there to anything indivisible); but the smallest thing perceptible can be perceived by the most perfect sense, according to the Philosopher On Sense and Sensibles 6.445b3-11 [Ord. II d.2 n.294]; therefore Christ’s body too will be able to be perceived by the most perfect vision, notwithstanding the body’s mode of existence here.

434. Against the other point [n.426]: there is no likeness between a separated substance and Christ’s body, because Christ’s body is a quantum with shape and color, while a separate substance is not.

435. The first argument about contact [n.427] is not probative, because contact, as it states an extrinsic relation of body to body, does not seem required necessarily for any absolute action of the sort that change in the sense power is, because an absolute action seems to be able to precede any such relation coming from outside; therefore although the body as it is here is not in contact with any other body (excluding such relation as comes from outside), it does not follow that it cannot alter anything, that is, change it toward an absolute form of sensation.

436. Against the second reason [n.428]: all that follows is that color does not have an ordering to place in the way that quantity (which is the subject of color) does not have an ordering to place; but this is only because there is no extension proportional to the extension of the quantity of the body. If therefore you infer that color is not extended with the extension of the containing quantum, I concede it. But if you infer that therefore it cannot alter the medium, this does nothing for the minor (sc. the minor that the body has no ordering through quantity to a place, [n.428]).

437. As to the third [n.429] about being derived through a medium, it is disproved through the first response [n.432], because an angel could well have some effect on the passive subject, derived in orderly fashion, according to the parts of that subject, although the angel himself, as agent, would not have a being located in place anywhere.

438. As to what is added about the light of glory [n.430], it is not evident how, because of its non-existence in place, the body could not be attained in idea of object by someone who has such light.

439. As to what is added about a miracle [n.431], the point is not proved. For the existence of this body, although in some respect it is like the existence of an angel, yet it is not so as to what is sensible and non-sensible, because an angel lacks the principles which are required in an object for an act of sensation, namely quantity and sensible qualities. But this substance [of Christ’s body in the Eucharist] has quantity and sensible qualities, although some mode [of being] is taken from them. But it would be necessary to prove that in order for there to be sensation of them this mode was simply a necessity.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

440. To the question, then, one can say that God of his absolute power can cause vision of this body in a glorious or non-glorious eye, even though that body were nowhere save in the Eucharist.

441. The proof is that vision is an absolute form, from Ord. I d.3 n.183; therefore it can without contradiction come to be when there is no relation of presence, or any such relation, to the object.

442. Second I say that no vision, even when caused in this way, can be of the body as it is here, because this would include the body as it is here being either the cause of vision or the proper and first term of vision. But the body as it is here cannot be the cause first as it is here, nor can it be the first term as it is here, because such causing and such term require a due disposition in the object that is the first cause and term - and that too as to location and as to due nearness and distance. But this body as it is here cannot have the due nearness to the organ nor the due distance as it is here, because it is not located in place as it is here. And a miracle here does not help, because the body as it is here is absolutely not visible, either as cause or as term of the vision; and there is no miracle for something that includes a contradiction.

II. To the Initial Arguments

443. To the first argument [n.423] I say that our senses too are not deceived about the Eucharist; for they per se perceive what is there, namely quantity, shape, color, and the like; nor is it possible now that our vision is deceived about the Eucharist, but there is only the intellect arguing, from what the senses apprehend, that the substance of bread is there. But this argument is sophistical, because although it happens thus for the most part yet not necessarily.

444. I say therefore that the senses of the blessed might perceive what our senses perceive, namely sensible accidents - nor would they in any way be deceived, just as our senses are not deceived; rather they would be deceived less than our senses are. But neither would the intellect of the blessed argue sophistically from the act of sensing as ours does.

445. To the point about doubt [n.423] I say that the blessed, left to their natural cognition, would not know by an act of sense that Christ’s body was here, but only by an act of intellect intuitively seeing that body, as was said about intuitive knowledge in the preceding question [nn.402-404].

446. To the second argument [n.424], that light at a point would not diffuse itself to the bodily organ so as to be visible, according to the common opinion which says that it is not possible for what is indivisible to be moved, from Physics 6.4.234b10-20. But this was discussed in Ord. II d.2 nn.301-304 about the motion of an angel.

447. And when you prove that it would diffuse itself spherically [n.424], this would have to be denied according to this way; indeed there would be need that it first have quantitative divisibility in itself before it might act on the passive subject.

448. Now the other argument, about the reflection of light from a point [n.424], is not cogent, because the first agent in reflection is not the light at a point that touches the body whence the reflection comes to be (if however light is at a point there), but it is the primary object itself from which the light is diffused; for the same object acts on direct, reflex, and refracted vision. Hence a point, when touching the surface of a mirror, does not diffuse the reflex ray; rather the first luminous thing (which diffuses its light as far as the mirror) immediately diffuses, in the form of a cause, the reflex ray.

449. And the reason is that because a natural agent acts according to the utmost of its power, when it is impeded from acting along the line most agreeable to natural action (namely a straight line, which is the shortest line) it acts along that line as much as it can, namely along a reflected straight line. And this is the reason why an image of the body diffused as far as the mirror is not seen in the mirror, but the body itself is of which it is the image.